講座主題：Differentiated Tracks within a Common Tournament: Evidence and Theory from China's Major Function Oriented Zoning Plan

主講嘉賓：曹光宇，北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院助理教授

時(shí) 間：2025年5月13日（周二）16:00-17:30

地 點(diǎn)：中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)沙河校區(qū)二教105

主持人：張龍?zhí)旄苯淌?/p>

點(diǎn)評(píng)人：劉悅教授

主 辦：中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院

致 謝：本講座獲得2025年中央財(cái)經(jīng)大學(xué)專(zhuān)題學(xué)術(shù)講座資助計(jì)劃支持

講座內(nèi)容：

This paper examines how differentiated performance evaluation affects incentives within tournament-style competitions among local governments. Leveraging China’s Major Function Oriented Zoning (MFOZ) plan, which split counties into“development”and“reserve”tracks with distinct evaluation criteria, we provide both empirical and theoretical analyses of its impact. Using a staggered Difference-in-Differences approach, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the size of the reserve track and prefecture-level economic performance. To interpret these findings, we develop a theoretical model of a modified Tullock contest with cross-track competition. The model highlights how the partial withdrawal of players from the main tournament into a separate track reshapes incentives and outcomes. Predictions derived from the model are further corroborated by county-level empirical evidence.

嘉賓簡(jiǎn)介：

曹光宇，北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)院財(cái)政學(xué)系助理教授。北京大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)學(xué)士、博士，普林斯頓大學(xué)當(dāng)代中國(guó)研究中心博士后研究員。其主要研究領(lǐng)域?yàn)閿?shù)字經(jīng)濟(jì)和公共經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)，研究成果發(fā)表于《經(jīng)濟(jì)研究》和RAND Journal of Economics、Journal of Public Economics等國(guó)內(nèi)外期刊，主持國(guó)家自然科學(xué)基金面上項(xiàng)目和青年科學(xué)基金項(xiàng)目等課題。