國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院雙周論壇講座通知

【主題】Regional Tournament, Trade Cost and Corruption: Evidences from China

【報(bào)告人】葛嬴，現(xiàn)任對(duì)外經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易大學(xué)國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)貿(mào)易學(xué)院教授、副院長(zhǎng)，2004年獲得加拿大多倫多大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)博士，研究領(lǐng)域包括國(guó)際貿(mào)易、公司金融、發(fā)展經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)、區(qū)域與城市經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)等，研究成果發(fā)表于Journal of Development Economics, World Development, World Economy, Journal of Banking and Finance等國(guó)際知名期刊。

【時(shí)間】2015年4月15日（星期三）下午3:00-5:00

【地點(diǎn)】國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易學(xué)院會(huì)議室（中財(cái)大廈1032室）

【論文摘要】It remains a challenging task to identify how prevalent is the corruption in the developing countries. In this paper we use firm-level data to identify the corruption-related domestic trade cost and local extortion in China. We construct two firm-level indicators to measure the corruption: Entertainment and Travel Cost (ETC) and Non-Tax Burden (NTB). We identify systematic differences in ECT and NTB between the exporters and non-exporters, using export tax rebate policy as the instrument. Our study suggests that globalization plays a complementary role to regional tournament in driving the "China's puzzle". Access to global markets provides an opportunity to pursue high growth under weak domestic institutions. On the one hand, regional tournament encourages local government to protect local market and hence significantly increases the relative cost of domestic trade to export. On the another hand, local bureaucrats have strong motive to promote export and thus significantly reduce the extortion on the exporters.